Where is cameron kocher

Jessica and Crystal Carr took advantage of the unexpected vacation to visit the six children of Richard and Trudy Ratti. Cameron was there too; he lived next door, and his parents had left for work early. Cameron, stocky and sandy-haired, often played Nintendo at the Ratti house.

Now I can get further than you. I beat the dragon. The game ended when Richard Ratti pulled the plug because the kids had left dirty cups and bowls in the room. The other children went out to ride the snowmobiles. Shannon Ratti said she did not hear the shot. She and Jessica, best friends, were riding a single snowmobile, with Shannon at the front. I asked her not to and she kept leaning.

She turned to face a suddenly grotesque figure. Within minutes her short life was ended. When Cameron returned to the house the other children were crying as Jessica lay mortally wounded in the living room. Could this boy of impeccable background, education and manners--never before in trouble, admired by teacher, minister, Cub Scout leader--kill out of vindictiveness, the implied motive? Could this even-tempered boy who, it is said, never struck out at anybody, understand the magnitude and finality of such a deed?

Cameron initially lied to state police, telling them he had been sleeping when the shooting occurred. His explanations of what happened on that winter day have varied. Harris Rabinovich, a child psychiatrist, testified for the prosecution that Cameron told him he was playing hunter and the rifle discharged. Martha Turnberg, the treating psychiatrist, testified for the defense that Cameron told her he was looking through the scope at the trees and snow and he did not see any children.

He denied intentionally firing the gun. Under Pennsylvania law, a murder charge must be filed in regular Criminal Court. A child between the ages of 7 and 14 is presumed incapable of committing a crime. See, e. Williams, Pa. Sourbeer, Pa. Wade, Pa. Leatherbury, Pa. Superior Ct. The "lower court noted that there was an absence of evidence that petitioner suffered from any mental disabilities," but did not rest its decision to deny transfer upon that absence alone.

The Commonwealth argues that the amendments to section codified the holding of Commonwealth v. However, in Pyle, the Court had to determine whether, inter alia,. Those two elements are codified at Title 42, Section a 4 iii B and C and are excluded from the criteria listed in the amended version of Section a.

Thus, the Commonwealth is incorrect in its characterization of Section a as a codification of our decision in Pyle. Accordingly, we upheld the trial court's use of the factors now codified at Title 42, Section a 4 iii A , B , and C , in exercising its discretion whether to transfer a murder case from juvenile court.

Since that decision, the Legislature has amended the Juvenile Act to enumerate the criteria with which to exercise that discretion, removing clauses B and C from consideration by the trial court. The result of the holding below would be that once a prima facie case of first degree felonious homicide is made out, and no insanity defense is available to excuse the homicide or reduce the charge, then the court will have no discretion but to hold the case for trial in the criminal court.

Such a result is patently inconsistent with Sections and of the Juvenile Act. Our holding does not prohibit discussion of the juvenile's mental state both at the time of the killing and at the time of the transfer petition. Section allows for consideration of "any other relevant factors. The Court of Common Pleas in its discretion may find that a behavioral disorder is a factor to be considered in determining whether the child is amenable to treatment now; it may also find that a sound mind devoid of any disease or defect at the time of the murder is a factor weighing against transfer of the case to juvenile court.

But to find that a lack of mental disorder is dispositive of the entire amenability question is to distort the clear legislative scheme. We therefore hold that the Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion in its denial of petitioner's petition for transfer. Accordingly, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas is vacated and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. That it was attempted in this instance shocks my conscience.

It is an understatement to say that this is a difficult case. But it has also often been said that hard cases make bad law. The Chief Justice has written for the majority in a dispassionate way, highlighting the law as expressed by the legislature, and I join in that opinion. Some of our colleagues, however, cry for the recognition of a public policy that children of the age of nine years and under how about 10 or 11 or 12 years of age, etc.?

Perhaps they are right. But that is a matter better left to the Legislature. It seems to me that the concurring justices are engaging in oxymoronic dialogue in this case because they do not really agree with the majority opinion or its rationale. On the one hand, they say that a nine-year-old killer should not be tried as an adult killer, yet, on the other hand, by joining the majority opinion they accept the fact as proved by the murderer's own statements and the opinions of the doctors who examined him that he knew exactly what he was doing and they are content to remand to the trial judge to determine in a proper analysis whether this child should be treated as a juvenile or an adult.

The Chief Justice, in the absence of a public policy statement by us or the legislature, concludes for the majority that this matter be remanded to the trial judge to determine, within the parameters of the Juvenile Act, whether this nine year old is amenable to treatment, supervision and rehabilitation.

But if the propriety of trying a nine year old for murder is in doubt then why waste everyone's time by a remand which will only raise more questions.

Do we then try him as an adult for murder of the first degree? And if he is convicted, do we give him the death penalty or mandatory life imprisonment and keep him incarcerated for the next 50, 60 or 70 years or more? I do not agree with the concurring justices in their attempt to legislate in this matter in the guise of expounding public policy. The law is presently clear and we must apply it. If public policy should be otherwise, then let the legislature come to grips with the problem and change the statute.

I vigorously and emphatically dissent. The trial judge herein was eminently correct in his interpretation and application of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.

Whether or not we personally find it "shocking" to try a nine year old child on a charge of murder in criminal court, this Court does not have the authority to rewrite a statute duly enacted by the Legislature. Justice Flaherty, in his concurring opinion, states that it is not the public policy of this Commonwealth to criminally prosecute nine year old children for murder. This is simply not true. Murder is a heinous crime, and the Legislature is unquestionably cognizant of this fact.

All crimes and all criminals were tried in "adult" criminal courts prior to the enactment of legislation early in this century requiring the special treatment of juveniles in our courts. There were no juvenile courts until the Legislature created juvenile courts. When the Legislature did so, it explicitly excluded murder from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts but gave juveniles charged with murder the opportunity to transfer their cases from criminal court to juvenile court if certain prescribed conditions were met.

This nine year old defendant is not an innocent victim of the tragic instances of accidental shootings occurring in homes where firearms are handled carelessly. He had been repeatedly instructed in the safe handling of firearms, he had shot a rifle while at a gun club to which his parents belonged, and he had gone hunting with his father.

The as yet uncontested evidence presented at the hearings on his petition for transfer show that the petitioner, Cameron R. Kocher, in an ill temper, took a key from where it was hidden in the base of a lamp, unlocked a gun cabinet, loaded the proper ammunition into a.

The rifle, which was in excellent working condition, had a heavy trigger pull and could not accidently discharge under normal circumstances.

The victim, whom the majority seems to forget ever existed, was killed by a bullet deliberately aimed and shot through her back, as she was riding as a passenger on a snowmobile. The bullet pierced her spine and right lung; she collapsed instantly, like a game animal shot by a skilled and experienced hunter, and died on the operating table a short time thereafter.

The petitioner carefully returned the rifle to the gun cabinet and hid the empty shell casing. When he returned to his neighbor's residence where the victim had been taken after the shooting, he exhibited no emotion on viewing her moribund body and proceeded to play Nintendo as if nothing were amiss.

Further, the petitioner, who had received a gash in his forehead when the gun recoiled and the scope struck him, lied about the cause of the gash to his neighbors, his parents and the police. We are not dealing with a guileless boy here and a victimless crime. The trial court meticulously reviewed and discussed the evidence in light of every statutory factor and found that petitioner had proven few factors in favor of granting the transfer request.

The petitioner's lack of previous misconduct and his age at the time of the offense were the only factors viewed in petitioner's favor. Significantly, age is only one statutory factor that the Legislature permits the courts to consider under section a of the Juvenile Act. Only after the trial court had considered all of the statutory factors, did the trial court consider petitioner's argument that he was suffering from an anxiety disorder that was amenable to treatment as a juvenile.

It was solely in response to this assertion that the trial court discussed the meaning and interpretation of the "amenable to treatment" language of section a 4 iii A , and concluded that the Legislature could not have intended for defects or disorders arising after the commission of the offense to justify a transfer request. The majority herein errs in reading the trial court's opinion as setting forth an absolute criterion for transfer that overrides every other statutory factor, and, indeed, the majority is plain wrong when it implies that the trial court ignored the statutory factors.

Questions about the petitioner's competency to stand trial, capacity to form criminal intent, and possible dispositions in the event of a guilty verdict are all properly matters within the jurisdiction of the criminal court where the Legislature has, in its wisdom, bestowed jurisdiction. Patty was a sewing-machine operator. The Carrs, friends of the Rattis from a nearby village, also brought over their two daughters, 7-year-old Jessica and 8-year-old Crystal. Donna Carr stayed to have coffee with Trudi, while her husband, Claude, went off with Richard to help a mutual friend move.

Just before leaving, Richard peeked into the room where the kids were playing Nintendo and was annoyed by the mess he saw. When he ordered the video game turned off, Cameron stood up to him. When Richard Ratti remained firm that there would be no more video games, Cameron got angry. The other kids went outside to ride snowmobiles, inviting Cameron to join them, but he went home. What happened next is basically agreed to by both defense and prosecution.

Keith Kocher kept the key to his gun cabinet in the base of a lamp alongside his bed. After leaving the Ratti house, Cameron got the key, opened the cabinet and took out a. He chose the right caliber bullets for that gun from a box of ammunition and loaded it. Then he removed a screen and pointed the weapon out a bedroom window overlooking the area where Shannon Ratti was giving Jessica Carr a ride on one of the snowmobiles.

A neighbor heard a gunshot and Shannon felt Jessica suddenly tighten her grip around her waist so much it hurt. The alarm had originally come into the West End Ambulance headquarters as a ''back injury,'' but on the way, the volunteer crew got a radio call updating that to ''shooting victim. Nobody knew exactly what had happened, and Richard was afraid that whoever ambushed Jessica still might be lurking nearby. Just before Jessica was taken to a hospital, where she died, Richard took a head count, saw Cameron was missing and phoned the Kocher house telling him to come back.

When he did, Richard and the others noticed the boy was bleeding from a wound on his forehead.